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PANDEMIC DISEASE, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND WAR
Laura K. Donohue*

Over the past two decades, concern about the threat posed by biological weapons has grown.
Biowarfare is not new.1 But prior to the recent trend, the threat largely centered on state use of
such weapons.2 What changed with the end of the Cold War was the growing apprehension that
materials and knowledge would proliferate beyond industrialized states’ control, and that “rogue
states” or nonstate actors would acquire and use biological weapons.3 Accordingly, in 1993
senators Samuel Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Dominici expanded the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program to assist the former Soviet republics in securing biological agents and
weapons knowledge. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act gave the Pentagon
lead agency responsibility.4 Senator Lugar explained, “[B]iological weapons, materials, and
know-how are now more available to terrorists and rogue nations than at any other time in our
history.”5 The United States was not equipped to manage the crisis.6
The actual acquisition of unconventional weapons by nonstate actors augmented concern.
In 1984, for instance, the Rajneesh cult in Oregon sought to prevent the local community from
being able to vote against its land development plans.7 The group contaminated local salad bars
with Salmonella typhimurium, infecting 751 people.8 In 1995 Aum Shinrikyo released a sarin
nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, killing twelve people.9 And in 1998 an American citizen,
Larry Wayne Harris, obtained plague and anthrax (a vaccine strain) and isolated several other
dangerous bacteria.10 His aim was to disseminate biological agents on U.S. soil, using a crop-
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duster, to alert the U.S. government to the Iraqi biological weapons threat, and to create a
separate homeland for whites.11
These and similar incidents pointed to an alarming trend: from previously a dozen or so
investigations per year, in 1997, the FBI opened 74 investigations related to the possible
acquisition and use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.12 The following
year, it investigated 181 possible incidents.13 Eighty percent of the cases turned out to be hoaxes,
but a significant number represented unsuccessful attacks.14 By January 31, 1999, Monterey
Institute for International Studies had compiled an open-source data base of 415 such incidents—
most of which occurred toward the end of the twentieth century—where terrorists had sought to
acquire or use weapons of mass destruction.15
All of this was before the attacks of September 11, 2001, and al Qaeda’s stated intent to
use biological weapons, backed by actual efforts to obtain biological agents.16 The anthrax
attacks in autumn 2001 further underscored the threat, killing five people and infecting eighteen
others.17 In 2002 President George W. Bush stated, “The gravest danger to freedom lies at the
crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and
nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states
and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.”18 New scholarship
began focusing on the threat.19 The consensus was that it was increasingly easier and less
expensive to launch a biological attack—using either natural or engineered agents.20 In order to
address the challenge, domestic preparedness needed significantly more attention.
Even as the United States became increasingly concerned about terrorist acquisition or
use of biological weapons, scientists and policy-makers began paying more attention to the threat
posed by naturally occurring outbreaks of disease. A series of public health incidents catapulted
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the discussion forward. The first, avian influenza, emerged in Hong Kong in 1997. It infected
eighteen people and killed six more.21 The disease quickly spread, becoming epizootic and
panzootic, having been identified on multiple continents in eagles, tigers, domestic cats, and
pigs, as well as aquatic and domesticated birds.22 Although it was not initially transferrable
between humans, scientists quickly became concerned that the rapid mutations of the disease that
occurred in infected animals and humans could quickly create a more virulent strain. Within a
decade, the patterns of mortality had changed: whereas in 1997, most deaths occurred among
patients older than thirteen years of age, by 2006 the fatality rate for infants and young children
had reached 90 percent.23 Recollections of the devastation caused by the 1918 Spanish Influenza
heightened fear: also avian in origin, within a year it had become one of the three worst
pandemics in history.24 More than 1 billion worldwide had come down with the flu (half the
world’s population), with between 50 and 100 million succumbing.25 The disease had killed
more than twice the number killed in World War I, with a mortality rate of only 2.5 to 5 percent.
These numbers paled in comparison to the more recent strain of H5N1, where 60 percent of the
humans infected with the disease had died.26 Calls for more stringent quarantine measures
emerged.27
A second disease outbreak proved equally disconcerting. In 2003 severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS), caused by a strain of the same virus underlying the common cold, hit
southern China.28 Within days, it had spread from a hotel in Hong Kong to Hanoi—and as far
away as Toronto. Transferred by a small number of “superspreaders,” within months some eight
thousand people in twenty-nine countries had contracted it, and nearly eight hundred people had
died.29 The sudden proliferation of academic and policy-oriented pieces on how to fight
emerging diseases followed.30
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A third outbreak underscored not just domestic but also international concern. On June
11, 2009, the World Health Organization declared that H1N1 influenza had become pandemic,
heralding the first such declaration since 1968.31 The first cases had been identified in Mexico
some two months previously. Although the pandemic proved to be less serious than first feared,32
its occurrence underscored the potentially devastating effect of the disease.
In keeping with these events, an increasing number of federal statutory and regulatory
initiatives have been introduced to address the threat posed by both biological weapons and
pandemic disease.33 Simultaneously, the executive branch has issued new policy documents,
directing agencies to conduct better research and to make more robust preparations for
responding to such threats, and laying out the planned course of action.34
Three broad observations about these initiatives follow. First, many of them tend to view
biological weapons and pandemic disease through a national security lens, linking the two in
terms of institutions, authorities, and approach. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, for
instance, created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), whose primary mission is to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism,
and minimize damage and assist in recovery from domestic terrorist attacks.35 But from the
beginning, DHS saw its role as much broader. Its website declared that “[in] the event of a
terrorist attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency, the Department of Homeland
Security will assume primary responsibility . . . for ensuring that emergency response
professionals are prepared.” The National Response Plan underscored DHS’s dual role: to assist
“in the important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the United
States; reducing the vulnerability to all natural and man-made hazards; and minimizing the
damage and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that occurs.”36 The Public Health

4

Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,37 as indicated by its title
alone, focused on preparedness for response to public health emergencies as well as biological
terrorism. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in proposing broader authorities,
noted, “Stopping an outbreak—whether it is naturally occurring or intentionally caused—
requires the use of the most rapid and effective public health tools available.”38 Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 10 asserted that the traditional public health approach was no
longer sufficient for the biological weapons threat: health care providers and public health
officials were considered among the first lines of defense. Accordingly, a new biodefense
program would combine and strengthen the state’s ability to respond to biological weapons and
natural disease. Similarly, in presenting the 2007 Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan,
White House officials and the Assistant Secretary of DHS underscored that the government
intended to treat biological weapons and naturally occurring diseases in similar fashion: “We at
DHS are focused on multi-use institutions that we can put into place for whatever emergencies
arise.”39 The link between the two is not just happenstance: the stated intent in releasing this
document was to redefine public health as a national security priority.40
A second observation that can be drawn about the measures that have proliferated is that
isolation and quarantine appear to be central to the legal framework and the policy response.41
Thus the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
streamlines and clarifies communicable disease quarantine provisions.42 It makes quarantine
applicable at an earlier stage by replacing language that previously required that the disease be
“in a communicable stage” with a measure allowing quarantine “in a qualifying stage.”43 The
White House expanded the list of quarantinable diseases to include SARS (April 2003),44 and
pandemic influenza (April 2005).45 In 2003 the Department of Health and Human Services
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amended its regulations to incorporate any quarantinable diseases listed by executive order,
bypassing rulemaking requirements.46 The Centers for Disease Control proposed new
regulations, specifying exact periods of quarantine and the procedure to be followed in the event
of its implementation.47 CDC suggested that “[q]uarantine of exposed persons may be the best
initial way to prevent the uncontrolled spread of highly dangerous biologic agents such as
smallpox, plague, and Ebola fever. . . . Quarantine may be particularly important if a biologic
agent has been rendered contagious, drug-resistant, or vaccine-resistant through bioengineering,
making other disease control measures less effective.”48 National exercises designed to press on
response in the event of biological weapons attack include planning for mass quarantine.49
Quarantine, indeed, is at the core of the U.S. Pandemic Influenza Strategy Implementation Plan,
which was issued by HHS as a blueprint for how agencies will respond in the event that avian
influenza becomes human-to-human transferrable. The reason this is remarkable is that, by the
document’s own admission, scientists generally agree that influenza is one disease for which
quarantine is likely to be particularly ineffective—yet the document refers to quarantine 138
times, and in a manner of consequence, detailing the use of quarantine both at ports of entry and
in the execution of geographic quarantine (cordon sanitaire).50
The third observation that can be made about the measures that have been adopted is that,
as biological weapons and pandemic disease have folded into the homeland defense realm,
growing attention is being paid to the role of the military in enforcing such provisions. HSPD 10,
for instance, considers the military to be central to U.S. biodefense.51 In large measure, this stems
from the biological weapons component of the threat. But in enacting the 2002 Homeland
Security Act, Congress explained that the federal government could use the military in response
to any national emergency, including natural disasters. Following Hurricane Katrina, the 2007
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Defense Authorization Act made such authority explicit.52 Renaming the Insurrection Act
“Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order,” the new language gave the president the
authority to impose martial law in the event of “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition”—without any contact or
collaboration with state officials.53 The shift to federal authority immediately incurred the wrath
of the state governors.54 The new powers had been “quietly tucked into the enormous defense
budget bill,” the New York Times pointed out, “without hearings or public debate. The
president,” moreover, “made no mention of the changes when he signed the measure, and neither
the White House nor Congress consulted in advance with the nation’s governors.”55 Senators
Patrick Leahy and Christopher Bond spearheaded new legislation that returned the Insurrection
Act to its original form. Nevertheless, the incident highlighted a shift in the federal view of
pandemic disease and human-engineered biological agents. Use of the military—both Title 32
troops and Title 10 forces—to respond to public health crises has broad support.56 Even without
the statute, the deployment of military in Katrina was largest military deployment in domestic
bounds since the Civil War.57 And the policy documents currently in place support the use of the
military for medical emergencies and for help in enforcing quarantine.58
There are practical reasons for the emergence of each of the three areas identified. The
association between biological weapons and pandemic disease stems from a common nexus:
both involve viral or bacteriological threats to human life. Similar institutions would likely be the
first to become aware of the spread of such diseases—that is, hospitals and public health entities
are likely to be on the front line of defense regardless of whether the disease is natural or manmade. At the onset of disease, it may be impossible to ascertain whether a disease is naturally
occurring, or the result of a concerted attack. The question thus becomes, institutionally, whether
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it even makes sense to separate them—or whether it makes more sense to have the same entities
identifying and responding. The consequences of either type of threat also may be largely the
same and demand that the state marshal similar resources to respond. In other words, from a
mitigation perspective, it matters little whether avian flu is deliberately disseminated or happens
to transfer from animals to humans. The same medical response may apply.
As for the use of quarantine and isolation, the government may be limited in the options
available. For both natural diseases and for engineered weapons there may not be vaccines—or
medication—available to counter the spread. Although medical opinion is divided as to the
effectiveness of such measures, there does seem to be consensus about the tendency of
quarantine and isolation at least to slow the spread of disease, buying time in the interim for the
government and public health officials to craft a more effective response. And for those who
view such steps as a last and unlikely resort, it nevertheless makes sense to think through the
consequences of such measures prior to their implementation, in the event that they may be
needed.
Turning to the use of the military, the armed forces have for decades been engaged in
biological weapons research. The military understands many such weapons. It is likely to have a
greater capacity to identify engineered diseases and potentially devastating natural diseases that
have served as a basis for BW research with precision. It may have access to a broader range of
antibiotics, vaccines, and prophylactic measures than civilian agencies. The military has prepared
its own personnel to face such weapons in a way that civilian agencies have not. Furthermore, it
may be the only institution with the necessary technology, resources, and manpower to be able to
effectively counter an attack—or a pandemic disaster.
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These practical considerations are important and, indeed, have been deeply influential in
the changes that are occurring. But what has become lost in the discussion are many of the
constitutional questions and policy concerns that present themselves. That is, once pandemic
disease and biological weapons are placed within a national security framework, disease
becomes seen through a lens of war. Broader powers, with fewer checks on them, come into
play. Rights become constricted, judicial remedies narrowed, and civilian agencies pushed to one
side. Federalism falls even further away as a check on national authority.
Such a change may be warranted when the country is at war and civil society itself is
threatened; but how does one mediate the response as a framing for all of public health, once it
has been placed on a national security footing? What happens when the federal government can
impose cordon sanitaire on cities, regions, or entire states, using the military to enforce it, in
response to annual outbreaks of influenza?
The United States has had long experience with natural disease and its weaponization for
which quarantine and isolation has been a common response. But despite the potentially
devastating consequences of both threats, for much of the country’s history, it was the states—
not the national government—that took the lead.
This chapter suggests that the current state of play is a result of two major shifts. The first
took place during the early part of the twentieth century with the federalization of quarantine
law. The second, and most recent, is the one identified above—that is, the integration of public
health and biological weapons concerns, the use of quarantine and isolation for both, and the
potential use of the military to enforce federal law.
While strong arguments support the first shift, the second is of concern. The history of
public health law in general, and quarantine and isolation in particular, underscores four
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constitutional questions: first, the degree to which Article II claims override the tension between
police powers and the Commerce Clause, driving the discussion into the realm of war; second, in
looking at a growing role for the military in the realm of public health, what the contours of
military deployment on U.S. soil might be; third, the extent to which Commerce Clause
authorities more generally may be marshaled in the realm of public health—an area traditionally
reserved to the states consistent with the Tenth Amendment; and fourth, whether recent
interpretations of the Necessary and Proper Clause militate in favor of an expanded federal role
in this area.
The chapter concludes its discussion with two policy considerations: whether the
increasing emphasis on biological weapons risks allowing the proverbial tail to wag the dog of
public health, as well as whether the use of quarantine and isolation ought to be considered as a
viable response.

I. Local Quarantine Authorities and the Weaponization of Disease
During colonial times, disease threatened the very existence of the settlements. Land and
maritime quarantine authorities were frequently introduced and rarely successful.59 They tended
to be reactive and temporary, responding to reports of sickness abroad with orders forcing ships
to moor offshore and preventing people or goods from entering colonial bounds. Harsh penalties
for breaking quarantine applied. Massachusetts Bay,60 New York,61 the Province of
Pennsylvania,62 New-Castle upon Delaware,63 Maryland,64 Rhode Island,65 South Carolina, and
Virginia passed similar measures.
England strongly objected to these measures. Quarantine devastated trade. But the
colonies persisted. It was well within their rights to protect colonists—indeed, the colonies
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themselves—from the threat. Special measures targeted the deliberate spread of disease, with
death without benefit of clergy providing one of the strongest penalties that could be applied.
During the War of Independence, reports emerged of the English use of disease as a
weapon. It was not the federal government, however, that subsequently obtained quarantine
authority. Instead, following the Revolution, it was the states that subsequently incorporated
quarantine provisions into their new statutes and, in some cases, their constitutions. Maryland,
New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, Rhode Island,
and Virginia all introduced quarantine laws, in the process conveying significant authorities to
local entities. Towns were so clearly in the lead on all questions of public health, that it was left
to them to decide when and to what extent communication and commerce could be severed with
any other town, city, region, or state in the United States where contagion raged. Seen as the
quintessential manifestation of state police powers, the protection of public health easily trumped
any claims to federal Commerce Clause authority.
A. Colonial Provisions
Massachusetts Bay provides a good example of how the colonies responded to the threat
of disease. In 1647 the General Court received reports that the “plague, or like grievous
[in]fectious disease,” had broken out in Barbados.66 The colony responded with an order
instituting quarantine against all vessels arriving from the West Indies.67 No one on board would
be permitted ashore, nor could anyone within the colony board such vessels, or purchase
anything carried by such ships, absent a valid license.68 The penalty for violating the order was
£100.69 Once the yellow fever epidemic ended, the order was repealed.70 Similar response
patterns marked subsequent outbreaks of disease.71

11

These measures had a significant (and negative) impact on the flow of trade, which
earned England’s enmity.72 The Privy Council soon became concerned that “the uncontrolled
manner in which the Colony was exercising its powers was becoming increasingly detrimental to
the economic welfare of England and the Empire.”73 When Massachusetts Bay passed a
particularly stringent measure in response to an outbreak of yellow fever, the Lords of Trade
argued that being able to retain a ship, indefinitely, on the grounds of the presence of any
contagious disease could not be allowed.74 The Privy Council agreed. “There is no such act as
this,” it wrote, “in any other of his Majesty’s plantations.”75 The terms “contagious, epidemical
and prevailing sickness” were too broad and “liable to great abuses,” even as the penalties
inflicted were disproportionately high.76 “We are therefore humbly of opinion,” the Privy
Council reported, “that the inconvenience thereby intended to be prevented may be better
provided against by order of the Governor and Council from time to time than by any standing
Act of the General Assembly.”77 Massachusetts Bay disagreed. It immediately passed a new
statute with minor alterations.78 (Instead of applying broadly to all contagious diseases, the act
specified plague, smallpox, and any “pestilential or malignant fever.”)79
Despite a rather aggressive approach to disease, many of the provisions the colonies
adopted to counter the threat proved insufficient. But instead of dispensing with such power, the
colonies steadily broadened the authorities available and introduced increasingly harsh penalties.
In 1714, for instance, the Massachusetts Bay General Assembly passed an act targeting vessels
arriving from France and other parts of the Mediterranean.80 Any shipmaster who failed to
observe the mandatory forty-day period of isolation would be put to death.81 Passengers coming
ashore without express license from the governor and council would be liable to three years’
imprisonment.82
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Massachusetts Bay adopted measures enabling it to perform domestic (land) quarantine
and isolation. In 1742 a statute targeting smallpox gave towns’ selectmen the power to obtain a
warrant to remove any persons “arriving from infected Places.”83 For those already residing in
the colony, the head of the family became required to report anyone falling ill and to mount a red
flag on the “most Publick Part of the infected House.”84 The flag would remain there “‘till the
House in the Judgment of the Select-Men is thoroughly aired and cleansed, upon Penalty of
forfeiting and paying the Sum of fifty Pounds for each Offence, one Half for the Informer, and
the other Half for the Use of the Poor of the Town where such Offence shall be committed.”85
Refusal or inability to pay the fine was punishable by whipping, up to thirty stripes.86 Where
more than twenty families contracted the disease, such measures were waived.87
Several other colonies considered and adopted similarly expansive quarantine provisions.
In New York, for instance, even under Dutch rule quarantine applied.88 Under English rule, the
governor and council issued further orders.89 The Province of Pennsylvania also made use of
quarantine.90 In 1700 the General Assembly introduced a statute prohibiting vessels arriving
“from any unhealthy or sickly place” from coming closer than a mile from land, absent a clean
bill of health.91 Passengers and cargo could only come ashore with a permit from the local
authorities.92 A £100 penalty applied.93 In 1719 the General Assembly of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations at Newport passed a law to prevent any vessel carrying smallpox “or any
other Contagious Disease” from anchoring within one mile of any landing place.94 The statute
required license to land from the governor, or in his absence, from one or more justices of the
peace, with failure to obtain such a license before landing carrying a penalty of £100.95 If
passengers or sailors came ashore, the justice of the peace could confine them “to any such
Place, as to him shall seem convenient, for to prevent the spreading of any Infection.”96
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The threat did not just come from abroad. Colonies frequently introduced measures to
prevent the spread of disease within North America. In 1721, for instance, Rhode Island passed
an act requiring all goods, wares, and merchandise from Massachusetts Bay to be transferred to
islands offshore, “exposed to the Sun, and Aired and Cleansed, not exceeding ten Days, nor
under six days, before they shall be permitted or suffered to be brought into any Dwelling House,
Shop or Warehouse in any Town within this Colony.”97 Criminal penalties applied.98 The law
required innkeepers to report ill lodgers and authorized justices of the peace being to remove the
sick “to any such Place as they shall think needful to prevent the spreading of the same.”99
As aforementioned, many of these provisions proved unsuccessful. But instead of
dispensing with such measures, the colonies often redoubled their efforts, introducing more
powers and harsher penalties. Thus, as smallpox continued to plague Newport, in 1743 the
colony repealed and reissued revised provisions.100 No ship, from any port, with any person ill
from any contagious disease would be allowed within a mile of shore.101 The governor and
justices of the peace could send medical personnel to confirm the health of the passengers.102 The
Town Council controlled all communications.103 Two-thirds of the money collected from
penalties incurred for breaking quarantine would be given to any informers.104 All costs
associated with addressing sickness on board the vessel—including the cost of ammunition for
the town’s guns forced to fire at the vessel to prevent it from coming into the harbor—was to be
paid for by the vessel itself.105 As for the health of the town’s inhabitants, not only must inns
submit health reports (with the justices of the peace empowered to remove anyone ill), but any
inhabitant of the town could be forcibly removed from his or her home and placed in the local
quarantine facility, “or any other convenient Place, in order to prevent the Spreading of the
Infection.”106 Thus emerged the legal groundwork for the use of cordon sanitaire. Guards would
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be placed to prevent anyone from entering or leaving homes or other quarantine areas, absent a
town license.107 A fine accompanied any infractions, with half to be paid to any informers.108
The harshest penalties applied to knowing dissemination of disease. The law made it a
crime to willfully or purposely spread smallpox within the colony.109 Anyone found guilty of
doing so would be put to death “without Benefit of the Clergy.”110 The attempt to spread disease
earned a similarly stringent punishment: all individuals “legally convicted of wickedly
endeavouring to spread [smallpox], shall be sentenced to be whipped, not exceeding Thirty Nine
Lashes, and suffer Six Months Imprisonment, and be kept to hard Labour.”111
B. The War of Independence
During the Revolutionary War, more than 130,000 colonists died from smallpox—an
outbreak attributed at the time to British use of the disease as a weapon.112 Reports first surfaced
that the British were engaged in biological warfare during the siege of Boston. By 1781 further
reports emerged of the deliberate spread of smallpox in Virginia.113 Other accounts followed: the
Pennsylvania Gazette, for instance, wrote, “Lord Cornwallis’s attempt to spread the smallpox
among the inhabitants in the vicinity of York, as been reduced to a certainty, and must render
him contemptible in the eyes of every civilized nation.”114 Benjamin Franklin noted as much in
his Retort Curteous..115 Historian Elizabeth Anne Fenn writes, “It would be easy to dismiss these
accusations as so much American hyperbole. But evidence indicates that in fact, the British did
exactly what the Americans said they did.”116
The disease had a significant impact on the colonists’ effort to win independence. It
decimated the Revolutionary Army at a critical time.117 The colonies, however, responded not by
introducing broader authorities or more stringent penalties, but by taking advantage of what little
was known, scientifically, about the disease. In Massachusetts, for instance, new laws authorized
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justices of the court of general sessions in any county to establish inoculating hospitals.118 In
Rhode-Island and elsewhere, similar measures permitted widespread inoculation.119
Following the Revolution, despite the use of smallpox as a weapon, and the devastating
impact of the disease, the states—not the federal government—continued to take the lead.
Maryland, for example, which introduced quarantine regulations in 1766, continued the act in
1769, 1773, 1777, 1784, 1785, 1792, and 1799.120 Upon reaching statehood, Maryland
transferred quarantine authorities to its constitution. Article 33 empowers the governor to “order
and compel any vessel to ride quarantine, if such vessel, or the port from which she shall have
come, shall, on strong grounds, be suspected to be infected with the plague.”121 The governor’s
authority to quarantine appears in the same sentence as the governor’s power, with the advice
and consent of the council, to embody and direct the state militia, suggesting a close correlation
between these authorities as an aspect of state sovereignty as well as state defense.122 Concerned
that even these provisions were insufficient, subsequent legislation expanded the governor’s
authority. From 1793 the governor’s powers in regard to any malignant contagious disease,
included the authority not just to prevent ships, goods, or persons from stepping on shore, but to
prevent “all intercourse or communication,” over land or water, between Maryland and any
region where such sickness was present—both in the United States and abroad.123 The governor
thus had the authority to sever domestic relations. Quarantine was so decidedly local, that it
overrode the union.
The context mattered: the union initially was not strong, as the failure of the Articles of
Confederation was to attest. State measures provided the first and last line of defense. But even
decades after the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, states continued to emphasize the autonomy
of not just state but also local authorities in the exercise of quarantine and response to disease.
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Maryland, for instance, made arrangements for the appointment of a local health officer in
Baltimore, who had the independent authority to authorize the quarantine of people and goods
for up to thirty days.124 Local ordinances continued this trend, with Baltimore passing measures
in 1797, 1798, and 1800, making further provisions for quarantine and the establishment of a
lazaretto to perfect the same.125
New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Connecticut, Delaware, South
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia followed a similar pattern.126 Authorities extended well
beyond maritime quarantine. In 1797, for instance, Massachusetts empowered selectmen to
remove and isolate any sick persons found within the town boundaries.127 Broad humanitarian
contours applied: isolation must be given effect in the “best way . . . for the preservation of the
inhabitants, by removing such sick or infected person or persons, and placing him or them in a
separate house or houses, and by providing nurses, attendance, and other assistance and
necessaries for them.”128 Like Maryland, Massachusetts drew a line between the state and the
rest of the country. Towns could require that anyone arriving from a region in the United States
in which contagious disease could be found to notify town authorities within two hours of their
arrival.129 Justices of the peace then had the authority to force any visitors to leave, with up to a
$400 fine for lack of cooperation.130 Any inhabitant of the town entertaining a visitor for more
than two hours after the departure warrant had been issued could be fined.131 Similar authorities,
pari passu, were given to local authorities to prevent any baggage or goods originating outside
the state from entering town boundaries.132
It was not just quarantine law that fell within local power. Broad public health concerns
lay, too, within their reach. Massachusetts soon established a Board of Health in Boston, which
focused on
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[all] such sources of filth as may be injurious to the health of the inhabitants of said town,
whether the same shall proceed from stagnant waters, cellars, drains, common sewers,
slaughter-houses, tan-yards, fish, fish-houses, fishing-boats, fish-boxes, oysters, oysterboats, hogs, hog-sties, docks, necessaries, livery and other stables, putrid animal and
vegetable substances, vessels, scows, or boats, or any other cause of any nature or kind
whatsoever, which, in their opinion, may be injurious to the health of the inhabitants . .
.133
Board members could make forcible entry to carry out their duties.134 To this board also were
assigned additional quarantine authorities, within which it had broad leeway.135
Some states went further. In 1794, for example, Connecticut introduced a statute allowing
towns to exile any sick person carrying a contagious sickness, where such infection “may
probably be communicated to others.”136 In the event that a suitable nurse could not be found, a
warrant could be issued to other towns in Connecticut, requiring them to provide assistance.137 A
heavy fine attached. Where individuals became sick, with any infectious disease, the head of the
family became required to fly a white flag, which could be removed only by the selectmen or by
a justice of the peace.138 In the event that contagious disease struck a town, all dog owners
became required to “destroy their Dogs or cause them to be killed.”139 Anyone infecting any
town in Connecticut, either by land or water, incurred a fine, with the selectmen ascertaining the
length and manner of airing of all commercial goods.140 Connecticut criminalized the transfer of
smallpox, with the burden of proof shifted to the person thus accused.141
C. Federal Reticence
Throughout this time, public health was firmly in the hands of the states, which, in turn,
delegated the authority to local entities to determine when and how to give effect to the
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provisions.142 The national government proved reluctant to become involved. Its initial response
was to duck and run: the first federal statute on the topic simply allowed Congress to reconvene
outside the capitol where “the prevalence of contagious sickness” or “other circumstances . . .
hazardous to the lives or health of the members” should occur.143 It was not until two decades
after the Revolution that Congress directly addressed quarantine, at which time it passed a
measure subordinating the national government to the states.144 Repealed three years later, the
statute allowed the president to provide assistance in enforcing quarantine, if states first
requested it.145
Debates in Congress preceding enactment of the measure demonstrated uneasiness at
curbing state rights and giving too much power to the federal government.146 The original bill
would have given the executive branch the authority to determine where quarantine stations
would be located. The House of Representatives strongly objected. Quarantine lay within the
states’ purview.147 Its impact on commerce paled in comparison to the importance of quarantine
in maintaining public health, which lay at the heart of state police power.148
Beyond the principled objections lay practical constraints. States were on the front line of
defense, and communication with the national government took too much time.149 It was for this
reason that states had long been “in the habit of regulating quarantine, without consulting the
General Government.”150 Life and death depended on speed.151 And history proved important:
states had previously introduced such measures—quod erat demonstrandum, quarantine must be
a state power.152 The few who supported a stronger federal role heavily relied on the Commerce
Clause in their assertions.153 They argued that as a practical matter, moreover, the federal
government had the authority—and resources—to ensure compliance.154 But their pleas fell on
deaf ears, and the bill passed, absent the offensive language.
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The federal government thus embarked on a path that subordinated it to state interests.
Resultantly, when Congress created the first marine hospital in 1796, the institution was left in
local control.155 Three years later Congress repealed the act, giving Treasury the authority to
require that U.S. officers assist in executing quarantine laws, consistent with state health
provisions.156 (In recognition of constitutional limitations, the statute explicitly noted that
alterations to duties of tonnage would require further congressional approval.)157 With the federal
government in a supportive role, the debates preceding adoption of the bill did not center on state
rights.158
Nevertheless, the statute marked the first forays of the federal government into the
quarantine domain, by creating a federal inspection system for maritime quarantine.159 Under
Treasury’s auspices, the national government could now obtain information about the spread of
disease along the Eastern seaboard.160 Subsequent orders issued by the Secretary of the Treasury
reiterated that Marine Hospital Service Officers, customs officials, and revenue officers were to
cooperate in enforcing local quarantine law and regulations.161
By the nineteenth century, public health generally, and quarantine in particular, had
become firmly established as within the state domain. Accordingly, in Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief
Justice Marshall described state police powers as:
That immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a
State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most advantageously
exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State . . .162
Marshall’s articulation summarized the state of play and became its own source of authority. The
attorney general subsequently relied on Gibbons to explain to the Secretary of the Treasury why
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the federal government could not itself issue quarantine regulations.163 State courts concurred.164
The states steadily expanded their reach into the public health arena, establishing local boards of
health and delegating to them when, where, and in what manner quarantine would be given
effect.165

II. Establishing the Federal Domain
While public health and quarantine remained central to state interests, the commercial
impact of a localized quarantine system gradually attracted more attention.166 Debates between
contagionists and noncontagionists further underscored the importance of a federal solution. The
Confederate Army harnessed disease as a weapon during the Civil War. Nevertheless, federal
controls did not immediately follow. The formation of the Marine Hospital Service, and its more
effective use of quarantine, however, again focused attention on a federal solution. Encouraged
by judicial opinions, Congress began to legislate in this area. But progress was gradual. By the
early twentieth century, the federal government had yet to preempt the states, which continued to
exercise their authorities. Ultimately, a direct confrontation between state police powers and
potential Commerce Clause claims was avoided through congressional leverage of the Spending
Clause. Treasury bought up the ports, thus the authority to exercise maritime quarantine. These
authorities eventually extended into the interior as the Public Health Act, and, later, the Stafford
Act provided federal authority to impose quarantine.
A. Foreign Relations
European powers, all of whom had long experience with quarantine as a way to stem the
introduction of disease, considered the localized American system to be outdated and ineffective.
Ships arriving in the United States from Central and South America, prior to making the voyage
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across the Atlantic, were not subjected to particularly rigorous inspection; nor did the United
States require bills of health or other assurances from ships departing from U.S. shores. The new
country’s vessels thus soon found themselves subject to stringent measures, requiring American
vessels, upon arriving in Europe, to remain in quarantine longer than those of other countries.
Efforts to convince Spain, England, and others to change these provisions fell on deaf ears.
Foreign countries simply did not trust vessels coming from the United States.167
Part of the problem with the U.S. approach was, precisely, the localized nature of
quarantine. The manner in which inspections and quarantine operated varied between ports.
Significantly different rules, standards, and levels of compliance existed.
Two problems thus presented themselves: the first centered on U.S. foreign relations and
the impact the localized system was having on U.S. trade abroad. The second stemmed from the
domestic arena, as the uneven application of public health measures created friction within the
United States as well.168 Congress began to lament the system as provincial and unscientific.169
Considering the magic influence of names, it were to be wished that the term quarantine
should be erased from the statute books of the Union, and of each particular State.
Regulations, precise and explicit, should, in the opinion of your committee, be formed to
prevent foul and infectious vessels, with sickly crews, from entering our ports, or
proceeding on any voyage in that situation.170
A uniform federal system would help to ensure stronger sanitary provisions and alleviate
European concern about vessels arriving from the United States.171
Two civil reform groups leant momentum to the political interest in federal control.
Contagionists, believing that disease transferred by individuals coming into contact with each
other, sought a more stringent and uniform system.172 Anticontagionists advocated for better
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national sanitation and an end to the local (indeed, any) quarantine regime.173 Either way, a
federal solution, predicated on the Commerce Clause, provided the answer. The Committee on
External Hygiene explained:
We consider that quarantine from its close connection with the U.S. Revenue Department,
and the important bearing which it has upon commerce (which Congress alone can regulate)
and upon travellers soon to be disperse throughout different and distant States of the Union,
is a national, rather than a State concern, and we cannot conceive that a uniform system of
quarantine can be established throughout the Union unless it be organized . . . as a national
institution.174
A series of National Quarantine and Sanitary conventions focused on not if, but how to reform
the system and to transfer control to the federal government.175 Such meetings ceased as the
country fell into the Civil War.
As during the Revolutionary War, disease became a weapon. Scholars report that the
Confederacy tried to spread yellow fever, smallpox, and other diseases among Union soldiers
and civilians.176 Plans ranged from sending infected individuals behind enemy lines and
distributing goods carrying contagion, to contaminating water sources.177 In 1863 this method of
warfare prompted the Union to issue an order outlawing the use of such techniques.178
Natural outbreaks of disease during the war further illustrated the degree to which states
depended on other regions to prevent the transfer of disease.179 But state rights still trumped. In
1865 the administration brought forward a bill to give the Secretary of War, with the assistance
of the secretaries of the Navy and Treasury, the authority to enforce quarantine at all ports of
entry, as well as domestic cordon sanitaire.180 Senators were incredulous. Henry B. Anthony (RRI) questioned the chair of the Commerce Committee on the extent of the proposed authorities.
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“[All] the powers at their command may be used if necessary,” Senator Zachariah Chandler
replied.181 Shocked, Anthony inquired whether the Secretary of War could impose martial law to
stem the tide of disease. Chandler answered that they could “use any power requisite to stop the
cholera.” Anthony objected: “I would rather have the cholera than such a proposition as this.”182
Historian Les Benedict explains, “Although during the Civil War a growing number of
people were demanding vigorous exercise of national authority, most Americans still regarded
general police regulation—the ordinary day-to-day legislation affecting crime, health, sanitation,
personal property, etc.—to be the responsibility primarily of the states.”183 Many congressional
members considered state and national quarantine authority, as in interstate commerce, to be
mutually exclusive.184 Lot M. Morrill (R-ME), maintained, “All sanitary regulations touching the
health of this country within the jurisdictional limits of the several States are matters of police
regulations.”185 While the Civil War thus may have marked an important step in the evolution of
American federalism, it was not immediately reflected in the realm of public health. By the late
nineteenth century, however, things started to change.
B. Economic Considerations and the Commerce Clause
Federal initiatives remained highly sensitive to state concerns. The move toward greater
federal involvement, when it did come, was not one grounded in war or national security, but
rather economic concerns: namely, the impact of disease on trade and the costs of maintaining a
robust system. Institutional reforms, which allowed the federal government to have greater
insight into the introduction and transfer of disease, and scientific advances, which moved
quarantine to a rational-based system, here mattered.186
In 1878 Congress introduced a new quarantine act.187 The statute marked the federal
government’s first assertion of control over quarantine, yet important limits applied. Regulations
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could govern only the arrival of ships from foreign ports.188 They could not run afoul of state or
municipal authorities.189 The statute also created a worldwide surveillance system, requiring U.S.
officers based overseas to send weekly reports on the health of foreign ports and to inform the
supervising surgeon general of the outbreak of any contagious diseases abroad.190 Congress
made further provision for underwriting scientific research on “the origin and causes of epidemic
diseases, especially yellow fever and cholera, and the best method of preventing their
introduction and spread.”191
The following year Congress expanded the number of federal quarantine stations and
created a national board of health.192 Again, restrictions emphasized the primacy of the states.
Members of the national board were directed to cooperate with and to help the local and state
boards of health, with their responsibilities limited to matters concerning cholera, smallpox, and
yellow fever. This time, however, Congress considerably loosened the purse strings, which was
to prove critical in the transfer of authorities to the federal government. The statute allowed
Treasury to buy up local ports, in the process assuming responsibility for stopping disease at the
borders. Local entities could voluntarily relinquish their authority, in return for financial
remuneration and preventing further drains on state coffers. Three years later, Congress freed up
money for states to request (and receive) up to $100,000 to assist in the event of an actual or
threatened epidemic.193
Even as early success stories involving the Marine Hospital Service lent momentum to a
new federal role,194 frustration about the current system grew. State measures were reactive and
failed to take into account broader public health needs.195 The federal government had to wait
until states requested assistance—which meant that it was not until epidemics were underway
that they could act.196 Local health laws, focused on local interests, had become corrupted by
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“the commercial interests of rival ports, the partisan struggles of opposing political factions, and
the heedless parsimony with which money has been doled out.”197 Ports of entry lacked
incentives to protect inland areas.198 Sanitary measures fell short: placing immigrants arriving
with a multitude of sicknesses in crowded, poorly ventilated, and unsanitary quarters, and then
sending them throughout the United States begged credulity.199
Proponents of a stronger federal role argued that it would, in contrast, create a uniform
approach and ensure that the costs were shared. The result would be better training for
immigration officers and, by stopping disease at the borders, the alleviation of barriers to
interstate trade. The federal government could shift its resources to ports in need, avoiding the
quagmire of local politics.200 A consensus among leaders in medicine, industry, and politics
slowly emerged: the federal government needed to be in charge.201
A timely case spurred the courts to consider the contours of state and federal authority. At
issue in Morgan’s Steamship v. Louisiana Board of Health was the right of the state legislators to
require vessels entering the Mississippi River to be examined and to pay a fee for the
inspection.202 The shipping company challenged the statute on the grounds that the measures
imposed tonnage duties and interfered with the federal regulation of commerce.203 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, saying that the precautions taken by the state were “part of and
inherent in every system of quarantine.” Despite the impact of quarantine on commerce, such
matters were reserved to the states—at least until invalidated by Congress:
[It] may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide for the
commercial cities of the United States a general system of quarantine, or shall confide
the execution of the details of such a system to a National Board of Health, or to local
boards, as may be found expedient, all State laws on this subject will be abrogated, at
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least so far as the two are inconsistent. But until this is done, the laws of the State on
this subject are valid.204
No longer, then, as Marshall had articulated in 1824, did public health and quarantine lie solely
within the state domain, but now the federal government could potentially act in this arena.
Congress readily accepted the invitation.
Over the next five years, federal initiatives followed on nearly an annual basis.205 A
relatively important change came in 1890, when Congress gave permission to Treasury to issue
regulations to prevent the interstate spread of cholera, yellow-fever, smallpox, and plague.206 The
statute carried criminal penalties. It became a misdemeanor for any U.S. officer or agent to
violate federal quarantine laws.207 Common carriers warranted stronger punishment for
violations.208
Another important change came in 1893, when Congress repealed the 1879 legislation.209
The statute required the supervising surgeon-general to conduct a study of all state and municipal
boards of health and to help both the states and the federal government enforce the rules in force.
It also gave Treasury the authority to enact further regulations where state and municipal
ordinances did not exist or were inadequate. State and local officers would enforce federal
regulations voluntarily; absent such cooperation, the federal government would enforce them
itself.210 Treasury could purchase warehouses to hold goods subject to quarantine under either
state or federal regulations, with the secretary authorized to prolong the period of retention (at
Treasury’s expense), subject to state law.211 The legislation required that all vessels entering U.S.
waters from foreign ports first obtain a bill of health from U.S. officers overseas. When infected
vessels arrived, Treasury could remand the vessel, at its own expense, to the nearest quarantine
station.212 To the president was given the authority to prohibit the introduction of individuals or
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goods from any designated region in which contagious disease was prevalent.213 Treasury could
receive any state buildings and disinfecting equipment, and pay reasonable compensation for the
same, where considered necessary to defend the U.S. against disease.214
The judiciary continued to hold the line drawn in Morgan’s Steamship. In 1902, Justice
White explained that states had the power to enact and enforce laws to prevent, eradicate, and
control the spread of contagious or infectious diseases.215 Such authority could be preempted.
W]henever Congress shall undertake to provide . . . a general system of quarantine, or
shall confide the execution of the details of such a system to a national board of health,
or to local boards, as may be found expedient, all state laws on the subject will be
abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent.216
But until the legislature acted, “such state quarantine laws and state laws for the purpose of
preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious diseases, are not
repugnant to the constitution.”217 Three years later, Justice Marshall Harlan reiterated, “Upon the
principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself
against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.”218 Like quarantine, the
compulsory smallpox vaccination at issue in Jacobson v. Massachusetts was a legitimate
exercise of state police power to protect public health.219
States continued to consider public health as central to state police powers.220 In 1913,
however, another incremental shift militated in favor of federal power. The Supreme Court
responded to the Minnesota Rate Cases by suggesting that states were free to adopt only
quarantine regulations that did not conflict with federal statutory or regulatory initiatives: “In
view of the need of conforming such measures to local conditions, Congress from the beginning
has been content to leave the matter for the most part, notwithstanding its vast importance, to the
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States and has repeatedly acquiesced in the enforcement of State laws.”221 The subtle undertones
of the decision suggested not that the states had the ultimate authority, but that it was only by
leave of Congress that they could act in this area.
Throughout this time, federal agencies quietly continued to assist the states and to accept
the responsibility of running the quarantine system in what one mid-twentieth-century scholar
referred to as “a process of accretion and erosion.”222 In 1921 the last state (New York)
transferred its quarantine facilities.223 The federal government at that point controlled roughly
100 stations and inspected some 2 million passengers and crew and 20,000 vessels per year.224
Surgeon General Hugh Cumming noted:
The transition of a quarantine system, composed of units operated by the municipal or
state authorities, to a compact federal organization has been gradual, but persistent. One
after another cities and states have transferred their quarantine stations to the national
Government, so that, with the passing of the New York Quarantine Station from state to
national control on March 1, 1921, the Public Health Service now administers every
station in the United States and in the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands.225
Cumming proclaimed it the triumph of science over politics.
C. Current Federal Authorities
Within about two decades of the federal government assuming control of the ports,
Congress passed measures giving the executive branch the authority to place individuals and
goods in quarantine. This legislation, the 1944 Public Health Service Act,226 is one of two pillars
on which the current federal system rests. The second is the 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.227
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Under the former, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has the authority
to make and enforce regulations necessary “to prevent the introduction, transmission, spread of
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the states or possessions, or from one State or
possession into any other State or possession.”228 Quarantine can be exercised only for diseases
listed in Executive Order 13295. Since 1983, cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague,
smallpox, yellow fever, and viral hemorrhagic fevers have been included. In April 2003
President Bush added SARS, and the following year, pandemic influenza.229
The Secretary of HHS may apprehend and examine any individual reasonably believed to
be infected with a designated disease in a qualifying stage and (1) moving or being about to
move between states, or (2) a probable source of infection to individuals who may be moving
between states.230 Where infection is found, HHS can detain the individual for such a time, and
in such as manner as may be reasonably necessary.231 Current regulations prohibit infected
individuals from traveling across state lines without explicit approval from a health officer of the
destination region, if applicable under their law.232 CDC maintains control over individuals
arriving from foreign countries, while the surgeon general has the power to prohibit designated
persons or goods from entering the United States altogether.233
The above regulations focus on regular authorities during peacetime. In times of war,
special powers apply. The Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the surgeon general, may
indefinitely detain individuals reasonably believed to be infected, and a probable source of
infection to members of the armed forces of the United States or to individuals engaged in the
production or transportation of supplies to the armed forces.234 Unlike peacetime authorities, it is
not necessary for an individual to be in a qualifying stage of infection. Eligible diseases continue
to be limited by Executive Order 13295.
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The surgeon general controls all quarantine stations and may establish whatever new
stations may be considered necessary.235 Overseas consulates are required to report on diseases
abroad, consistent with rules set forth by the surgeon general.236 Bills of health continue to be
required for all vessels entering or leaving U.S. water and air space.237 Violation of general
federal quarantine provisions is punishable as a criminal misdemeanor, with the violations of
specific orders subject to a fine of up to $250,000, or one year in jail, or both.238 Federal District
Courts may enjoin individuals and organizations from violating CDC regulations.239
The second piece of legislation marking the framework is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.240 This legislation is the legacy of the eighteenth-century
measures designed to allow the federal government to respond to requests for assistance in the
event of an emergency. In 2000 the Disaster Mitigation Act amended the Stafford Act to
encourage state, local, and tribal areas to coordinate planning prior to actual disasters.241
Two types of declaration may be made under the Stafford Act: a major disaster
declaration consistent with Title IV, and an emergency declaration under Title V. The former
depends upon a state governor making a formal request to the president for federal assistance.
Such help can apply only to natural catastrophes, or, regardless of their source, actual fires,
floods, or explosions. The language, then, does not appear to include non-natural incidents, such
as criminal activity, terrorist attacks, or acts of war (although it would include any fires, floods,
or explosions thereby resulting). In order to qualify for assistance, states must have previously
implemented a plan in coordination with the federal government. The president has the option of
declining the request.242 While the statute does not explicitly mention quarantine, it does give the
executive the ability to provide health and safety measures (presumably included the detention of
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those suspected of carrying contagious disease).243 There is no limit on the amount of funds that
can be requested.
Under Title V, an emergency declaration may be made either pursuant to the request of a
governor, or the president may simply declare an emergency in which the incident involves an
area of “primary Federal responsibility.” For the former, the decision to grant the request is
discretionary. There are no limits on the type of emergency for which help is requested, but the
total amount that can be obtained is limited to $5 million per declaration.244 For the latter, it is
not entirely clear what constitutes an area of primary responsibility. Rather, the statute provides a
general category—that is, “subject area[s] for which, under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority.”245 In practice, unilateral declarations have tended to involve federal property. In such
cases, FEMA has primary responsibility (arguably bypassing the Secretary of DHS altogether).
Quarantine measures continue to be in flux. In 2005 the Centers for Disease Control
proposed new regulations that would structure quarantine along the incubation period of each
disease, as well as allow for administrative review.246 Largely in response to concerns expressed
by common carriers, which would have been required to collect more information from their
customers as part of the rule change, the initiative was stalled. More recently, the Department of
Health and Human Services updated five existing definitions, added thirteen new definitions, and
created a new scope and definitions section in the existing law.247
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, these regulations are but one part of a much
broader movement to address both biological weapons and pandemic disease. The Department of
Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control, the Department of Homeland
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Security, and the Department of Defense, among other agencies and departments, have taken
steps to respond more effectively to the twin threats.
Three observations about the recent measures follow: first, they tend to link biological
weapons and naturally occurring disease, seeing both as a national security threat; second, they
emphasize quarantine and isolation as a potential response; and third, they anticipate the use of
the military to enforce social distancing provisions. As outlined in the above sections, the recent
changes represent a second major shift that has occurred in the United States in the realm of
public health and quarantine law.

III. Constitutional and Policy Challenges Going Forward
In the early twentieth century the move to federal control over the introduction of disease and its
transfer between the states marked an uneasy detente between the powers reserved to the states
through the Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause authorities. Practical economic concerns
and the Spending Clause proved critical in carving out a federal role. The most recent shift,
however, raises a number of further constitutional concerns not as easily accommodated within
the U.S. legal tradition.
Some portion of these concerns center on individual rights. Scholars have considered
many of the potential rights violations embedded in broader quarantine authorities, such as Fifth
Amendment due process and the writ of habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause.248 These
are important concerns. Notably, the courts have yet to address many of the most important
questions in this realm, such as how long an individual may be held in quarantine or isolation
before a hearing is required, precisely what procedures may satisfy due process, or what
evidence must be produced to justify restrictions on liberty. Nor have courts considered the level
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of direction that must be given, and the degree of noncompliance required, to justify forcible
detention.249 Some challenges have been raised on takings grounds; here, too, the record is fairly
sparse.250
But beyond these concerns, almost no attention has been paid to the structural issues that
present themselves: specifically, the articulation of public health as an Article II claim, the role
of the military in executing quarantine and isolation on domestic soil, the limits of federal
Commerce Clause authorities in light of Tenth Amendment state police powers, and evolution of
Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence.
Additionally, at least two important policy considerations attend: the extent to which
biological weapons concerns may achieve preeminence and thus drive the subsequent public
health discussion; and whether quarantine and isolation should be looked to as a first response.
While it is not the intent of this chapter to conclusively explore these concerns, each deserves
some attention.
A. Public Health as Article II War Powers
The first and perhaps most important structural question that presents itself relates to the
shift in collapsing pandemic disease and biological weapons into a national security framework.
Consider the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy, issued in May 2010, which cites,
inter alia, weapons of mass destruction, pandemic disease, natural disasters, and terrorism as
pressing national security concerns.251 Coupled with a new role for the Department of Defense,
the specter of treating public health concerns within a war, or national security emergency
framing, presents itself. The result bypasses the uneasy accommodation between state police
powers and Commerce Clause considerations, pushing the constitutional analysis into an Article
II realm.
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The Constitution divides war powers between the executive and legislative branches. In
Article II, it falls to the president to execute the powers of commander-in-chief.252 Under Article
I, Congress is imbued with the authority to declare war and to appropriate U.S. treasure for the
same.253 To the legislature also is given the authority to call forth the militia, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions.254 Between these, a sort of “twilight zone” of concurrent
authorities operates.255 As Justice Jackson famously suggested in Youngstown, where the
president acts with congressional authorization, his authority within this area of concurrent
power is at its zenith.256
Where statutory measures, such as the changes to the 2007 Defense Authorization Act,
explicitly award the president the authority to use the military to respond to natural disasters,
pandemic disease, or terrorist attack, the president appears to be acting in full power.
But Congress did not end its treatment of the federal role in regard to quarantine with the
passage of the 2007 statute. Instead, in response to strong opposition from state governors,
Congress subsequently withdrew the relevant provisions. Resultantly, in the event of pandemic
disease, at least as a matter of the president’s commander-in-chief authorities, a strong argument
could be marshaled that the president would be acting neither in the zone of explicit
congressional approval, nor absence of the same, but at the “lowest ebb”: that is, where Congress
has explicitly withdrawn such authority. Admittedly, withdrawing a power is not the same as
affirmatively denying its existence. At a minimum, however, the explicit withdrawal of
congressional consent suggests a lower threshold than that of legislative sanction.
So the framing of pandemic disease as a national security concern—particularly where
the initial outbreak of disease may or may not have arisen from a biological weapons attack—
gives rise to the question of where the president’s defensive power ends and Congress’s authority
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over the decision to take the nation to war begins. As a textual matter, Congress has the power to
initiate a condition of war. The president does not. Conversely, the president has the power to
conduct war. Congress does not. The careful selection of the word “declare,” rather than “make”
appears to have been designed to retain in the president the traditional authority to defend the
nation against, or “repel,” sudden or imminent attacks—that is, a defensive war power. It also
appears to sidestep any suggestion that Congress’s power to declare war also carries the authority
to manage the conduct of the war.
So what happens if the president responds to an outbreak of disease as an act of war, on
the grounds that such events may (or may not) stem from biological attack? Does the president
have the authority to do so?
Consider the question of mobilization—that is, the decision to employ the country’s
armed forces to respond to a potential pandemic (or biological weapons attack). For much of the
modern period, executive practice with regard to the commitment of troops and use of the
military has substantially departed from the constitutional text. The Korean War (1950–53), the
Cuban missile crisis, Kosovo (1999), the recent bombing of Libya (2011), and a broad range of
covert operations (such as the invasion of Grenada [1983]) have involved substantial military
commitments that occurred outside explicit congressional approval or declaration of war. If an
epidemic or outbreak of disease were to be classed as an act of war, in what sort of capacity
could the military be used and for what duration?
The 1973 War Powers Resolution, passed in response to perceived overexpansion of
unilateral presidential war-making with regard to Vietnam, is here relevant.257 This legislation
authorizes the president to use military force in three circumstances: declaration of war, specific
statutory authorization, or national emergency.258 The president must consult Congress in every
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possible instance. Any military action must be reported within forty-eight hours, and use of the
forces must terminate within sixty days of a report to Congress, unless war is declared, a sixtyday extension is granted by Congress, or Congress is physically unable to meet. There is a sense
in which this statute, coupled with a failure to terminate presidential military action, has
implicitly created a sixty-day “safe harbor” for unilateral presidential action.
Successive administrations, beginning with Nixon, have questioned the constitutionality
of the War Powers Resolution.259 They have argued that it is an unconstitutional usurpation of
Article II authority, undermines US foreign policy, fails to require positive congressional action,
and undermines executive and legislative branch cooperation.260
These arguments can be challenged. As a textual matter, it falls to Congress, not the
president, to move the country to a state of war. If one grants the constitutionality of the
resolution, then the statute may apply to situations in which the president seeks to use the
military in response to a perceived pandemic or biological weapons attack. The limits, however,
laid out in the statute would apply.
Notably, the debates over the War Powers Resolution, have been predicated largely on
the president’s use of the military overseas.261 What happens when the question becomes the use
of the military on domestic soil? Constitutional jurisprudence here is particularly thin.
In 1862 the Prize Cases were argued before the Supreme Court, which considered the
constitutionality of President Lincoln’s blockade of Southern ports.262 Justice Robert Grier,
writing for the Court, suggested that the president, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
had a broad range of power, including instituting a blockade.263 Although Congress had not
explicitly declared war, it had, in that instance, adopted a statute that ratified the Emancipation
Proclamation. Consisting of two executive orders, the proclamation explicitly rested on the
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president’s military power to seize and confiscate enemy resources in times of military
engagement.264 Regardless of the proclamation, however, the Court considered the president’s
actions constitutional.
The Prize Cases stand, first, for the proposition that the president’s power to respond to
military attacks on the United States does not depend on Congress having declared war. This is
part of the executive power retained by the president, confirmed in the Commander-in-Chief
Clause. Second, regardless of whether a war is formally declared, the president, as commanderin-chief, possesses the full executive power with respect to the conduct of military hostilities.
Would, however, responding to a pandemic potentially stemming from a biological
weapons attack qualify as military hostilities?
It may be, at the outset of a pandemic, nearly impossible to ascertain whether the spread
of the disease is due to natural causes, terrorist attack, or an act of war levied by another country
against the United States. Consider plague. Long a mainstay in biological weapons arsenals, the
disease is also naturally occurring. A traveler from Algeria could contract the disease, return to
the United States, attend community events, and eventually present at a hospital for treatment.
Initially, it may not be clear whether the individual accidentally contracted the disease or is being
used as a vector by which to spread it throughout the country and to take out U.S. medical
facilities. In either case, the effects on the country from the carrier’s initial actions would be
largely the same. Either way, significant resources may be necessary to mitigate the effects of the
disease.
What authorities does the president have in such a circumstance? Can the president use
the military—and to what extent? As a constitutional matter, a stronger case can be made for
Article II powers in the event of known biological weapons usage and, particularly, known use
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of biological agents by another country. It may be, however, impossible to know at the outset if
such circumstances hold. Should the executive be given power in anticipation of such a result? If
not, does it make sense to leave the determination of when Article II comes into play in the
hands of the executive branch—which then benefits from a significant expansion in its authority?
There is a certain conflict of interest in allowing the president to essentially determine the
contours of executive power. If there is no overt enemy in regard to which war can be declared,
then further questions arise with regard to what limits, if any, can be placed on the executive.
This leads naturally to the question of whether Congress would need to pass, for instance,
an explicit authorization for the use of the military to support quarantine and isolation. On at
least three occasions the legislature has authorized use of the armed forces short of declaring
war.265 While argument can be made that this still falls short of the constitutional provisions that
require Congress to declare war—instituted precisely to set the bar high and to avoid use of the
military absent legislative approval—it may be the best vehicle to ensure constitutional
compliance. This analysis, however, still begs the question of the specific role of the military on
U.S. soil.
B. Role of the Military
The 1807 Insurrection Act governs the president’s authority to deploy troops within
domestic bounds.266 Like the Stafford Act, the statute requires that whenever an insurrection
occurs, “the President may, upon the request of the legislature or of its governor if the legislature
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the
number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to
suppress the insurrection.”267 Absent a governor’s request, in the event that the president
“considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
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authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States . . .
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,” the militia and armed forces can be used.268 Such
measures, however, are explicitly directed to suppressing “any insurrection, domestic violence,
unlawful combination, or conspiracy,” where such violence interferes with execution of use laws
or operation of the courts.269
A few observations about this language can be made. First, the mere incidence of
sickness—natural pandemic or biological weapons–related in origins—is insufficient to justify
military intervention. The statute explicitly requires an actual breakdown in law and order.
Hypothetical risks are insufficient. Second, even if violence does result from an epidemic, the
role of the military appears to be limited to suppressing the violence—not responding to the
medical needs of the population by, for instance, distributing and administering vaccines,
transporting ill patients, testing blood samples, treating the ill, performing quarantine and
isolation on civilians, establishing triage stations, and the like. The changes made to the
Insurrection Act by the 2007 Defense Authorization Act would have allowed the president to
federalize the National Guard to respond to a “natural disaster, epidemic or other serious public
health emergency, terrorist attack or incident,” in the event that the president unilaterally
determined that “authorities of the state or possession are incapable of maintaining public order.”
But these were precisely the changes subsequently rejected by Congress.
Even considering the role of the military in a law enforcement capacity, it is to be
remembered that the Framers evinced considerable concern about standing armies.270 Following
Reconstruction, such concerns became enshrined in the Posse Comitatus Act, which significantly
limited the powers of the federal government to use the armed forces to conduct law
enforcement.271 Under the Posse Comitatus Act, “Whoever, except in cases and under
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circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any
part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”272 Congress later added
proscription against use of armed forces to make arrests or conduct searches and seizures. Most
recently, Congress expressed its sense reaffirming the continued importance and applicability of
the Posse Comitatus Act when it established the Department of Homeland Security, leaving open
the use of the armed forces for law enforcement when authorized by act of Congress or the
president to fulfill constitutional obligations to respond “in time of war, insurrection, or other
serious emergency.”273
This language does constitute a statutory, not a constitutional, limit. Indeed, as a
constitutional matter, it could be argued that the Posse Comitatus Act is itself an unconstitutional
limit on the powers of the president.
In light of the statute, however, two distinct challenges could be brought to the role of the
military in establishing and enforcing quarantine and isolation measures in response to either
naturally occurring pandemic or the spread of an engineered agent: (a) the type of activities in
which Title 10 troops engage in the performance of quarantine; and (b) the conditions under
which the government may federalize Title 32 troops, removing them from state control. The
courts have yet to rule on these difficult questions.
C. Marking the Boundaries of the Commerce Clause
Setting aside for the moment the constitutional issues embedded in linking and placing
pandemic disease and biological weapons within a national security framework, broader
constitutional questions about the extent to which the federal government can act in public health
persist. Public health law lies at the heart of state police powers. Questions remain about the
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extent to which Commerce Clause authorities empower the federal government to legislate in
this realm. The Tenth Amendment itself remains silent on the precise scope of the powers
reserved to the states—or to the people.274 Precious little consideration of the contours of the
authorities reserved to the states can be found in the papers of those present at the constitutional
convention.275 Yet what becomes clear from the historical exposition of quarantine provisions in
the nineteenth century, discussed above, is that their impact on commerce was insufficient to
altogether wrench them from the grasp of state power.
Chief Justice Marshall thus noted in 1824 that quarantine lay at the very heart of those
authorities reserved to the states.276 Thirty years later, Justice Grier explained that internal police
powers, which included every law introduced for the preservation of public health, “are not
surrendered by the states, or restrained by the Constitution of the United States, and that
consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and
conclusive.”277 No federal regulation could “supersede or restrain their operations, on any ground
of prerogative or supremacy.”278 Quarantine, whatever its impact on commerce, resided at the
core of state police power:
[Q]uarantine laws, which protect the public health, compel mere commercial regulations
to submit to their control. They restrain the liberty of the passengers, they operate on the
ship which is the instrument of commerce, and its officers and crew, the agents of
navigation. They seize the infected cargo and cast it overboard. The soldier and the sailor,
though in the service of the government, are arrested, imprisoned, and punished for their
offenses against society. . . . All these things are done not from any power which the states
assume to regulate commerce or to interfere with the regulations of Congress, but because
police laws for the preservations of health, prevention of crime, and protection of the
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public welfare must of necessity have full and free operation according to the exigency
which requires their interference.279
The exigencies of the social compact required that such state laws “be executed before and above
all others.”280
Accordingly, in 1868 Thomas Cooley explained, “Numerous . . . illustrations might be
given of the power in the States to make regulations affecting commerce, and which are
sustainable as regulations of police. Among these,” he continued, “quarantine regulations and
health laws of every description will readily suggest themselves, and these are or may be
sometimes carried to the extent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected
with disease or otherwise dangerous.”281 Such regulations, at least with regard to Commerce
Clause considerations, “generally passed unchallenged.”282 In 1886 the influential legal
commentator Christopher Tiedeman further noted:
This police power of the State extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas, it being of universal
application, it must of course be within the range of legislative action to define the mode
and manner in which every one may so use his own as not to injure others. Any law
which goes beyond that principle, which undertakes to abolish rights, the exercise of
which does not involve an infringement of the rights of others, or to limit the exercise of
rights beyond what is necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general security,
cannot be included in the police power of the government.283
That same year, as a matter of case law, Morgan’s Steamship, followed in 1902 by Compagnie
Francaise, acknowledged the strong role of the states in public health—while leaving the door
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open to federal preemption. In 1905 Jacobson placed even more weight on the side of the states,
reiterating Marshall’s position in Gibbons.
As a matter of constitutional law, then, despite a significant impact on commerce, it
appears that the exercise of quarantine by the states is to a great extent protected. This does not
mean that the federal government has no role to play. Morgan’s Steamship and Compagnie
Francaise, as noted above, both left open the possibility of preemption. Encouraged by the
Court’s position, Congress did begin to legislate, and in 1963 the Court upheld challenge to
federal quarantine.284 At that time, the World Health Organization had declared Stockholm to be
a smallpox-infected area. When a passenger from Stockholm arrived in the United States and
was not able to produce documentation showing that vaccination had taken place, the Public
Health Service quarantined the passenger for fourteen days. The District Court noted that the
federal government had acted in good faith, that the individual had had a history of unsuccessful
vaccinations, and that detention during the incubation period was required to determine whether
the individual had been infected. The case, however, left unanswered the structural questions that
bedevil the line between state and federal authorities. While the federal government may be able
to preempt the states in some areas related to quarantine, the authority to impose the same at a
state level is still firmly rooted in the powers reserved to the states.
The uneasy compromise that has been reached is that quarantine provisions related to the
country’s borders, such as along the coastlines or on the Canadian or Mexican border, fall firmly
within the federal domain. But what happens when every airport, seaport, and bus or train station
becomes a point of entry or interstate transfer? Does the federal government have the authority to
quarantine and isolate all travelers? This is the current position of the federal government for
interior quarantine—that is, coming into contact with individuals who may be about to move
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between states. But is this a meaningful limit on federal power? While one could devise a remote
mountain scenario, where such contact would be unlikely, in an age of mass transit, such cases
certainly represent the exception, not the rule. Would it allow the federal government to place a
cordon sanitaire around a city, absent state acquiescence? At some point such authority
eviscerates the power reserved to the states with regard to quarantine, in the process raising
concerns well known to the founders about the concentration of authority in federal hands.
Moreover, is the test adopted by the federal government—coming into contact with
interstate travelers—the correct one? For instance, what level of impact on commerce is
necessary? Does it matter what the disease is? Under executive order, pandemic influenza is now
included. Does that mean that every flu season the federal government could impose quarantine
and isolation on citizens? What about the manner in which the disease is disseminated? Does it
matter if it is criminal in nature? Would, for instance, medical measures aimed at mitigating the
salmonella outbreak at salad bars in Oregon satisfy Commerce Clause considerations—or would
that fall within state police powers? While the authority of Congress appeared to be expanding in
this area throughout much of the twentieth century, more recent cases—namely US v. Lopez and
US v. Morrison, suggest a possible contraction.
D. Limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause
A final structural question presents itself—that is, even if we have seen limits on the
Commerce Clause, recent interpretations of the Necessary and Proper Clause give effect to
broader congressional control of interstate commerce. That clause gives Congress the authority
to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”285 Gonzales v. Reich proved significant in this regard,
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upholding federal efforts to override California’s legalization of cannabis for medical purposes.
Justice Scalia distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison, writing, “Congress may regulate
noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so ‘could . . . undercut’ its
regulation of interstate commerce.”
US v. Comstock extended this line of reasoning: in a 7–2 decision written by Justice
Breyer, the Court upheld federal law allowing the government to indefinitely detain “sexually
dangerous” federal prisoners following completion of their sentences.286 The majority considered
continued detention as “necessary and proper” to implementing congressional power to operate a
penal system and act “as the custodian” of prisoners held within it.287
The decision, however, raises questions about how quarantine would fare in a similar
context. The Court adopted a rational basis test, concluding that the clause allows any exercise of
authority that “constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a
constitutionally enumerated power.”288 In a separate concurrence Justice Kennedy argued against
the use of this test.
The terms “rationally related” and “rational bases” must be employed with care,
particularly if either is to be used as a stand-alone test. The phrase “rational basis” most
often is employed to describe the standard for determining whether legislation that does
not proscribe fundamental liberties nonetheless violates the Due Process Clause. . . . The
phrase . . . should not be extended uncritically to the issue before us.289
While the immediate law at question in Comstock was “a discrete and narrow exercise of
authority over a small class of persons already subject to the federal power,” involving “little
intrusion upon the ordinary processes and powers of the states,”290 the same would not be true of
a broad federal authority over state public health. Justice Alito, like Kennedy, expressed concern
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in his concurrence about giving Congress “carte blanche” via the Necessary and Proper
Clause.291 Justice Thomas wrote an even more scathing dissent, much of which was joined by
Justice Scalia, suggesting that “Congress may act under [the Necessary and Proper clause] only
when its legislation ‘carr[ies] into Execution’ one of the Federal Government’s enumerated
powers.”292
Just as “[no] enumerated power in Article I, §8 [of the Constitution], expressly delegates
to Congress the power to enact a civil-commitment regime for sexually dangerous persons . . .
,”293 no specific enumerated constitutional power gives the federal government authority over
public health. To the contrary, since the founding, this has been considered to be reserved to the
states via the Tenth Amendment. Nor, under Justice Thomas’s view, could quarantine provisions
be upheld simply because Congress has passed other laws more directly affecting Commerce.294
Instead, such statutes would be valid only insofar as they facilitated the use of the previous law
to implement Congress’s enumerated authorities.
In Comstock, the majority considered five factors that contributed to their decision:
We take these five considerations together. They include: (1) the breadth of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal involvement in this arena,
(3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in light of the government’s custodial
interest in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the
statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope. Taken
together, these considerations lead us to conclude that the statute is a “necessary and
proper” means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal
criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for
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those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned but who
may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others.295
What is less than clear, as Justice Thomas points out in his dissent, is exactly how the five-point
test should be applied in the future.296 How would this reasoning transfer over to the quarantine
realm? In regard to the second consideration, for instance, there is a long history not of federal
involvement in this arena but of state and local involvement. The majority’s third consideration
(sound reasons for enacting the statute in light of the government’s responsibilities) may reflect
in a strong federal interest in safeguarding the country from pandemic disease; but the fourth
consideration, the extent to which state interests are accommodated, may constrict in the
evolution of these provisions. The direction that the most recent quarantine measures are taking
may run afoul of the factors laid out in Comstock. Whether the Court’s jurisprudence in this area
will allow greater or lesser leeway remains to be seen.
E. Risk of Distorting the Most Effective Responses to Public Health Concerns
We turn then to two policy concerns that mark the most current shifts with regard to
public health. The first is whether allowing the biological weapons conversation to upstage
public health—that is, set the agenda for how to respond to disease—is a good idea.
The United States spends twice as much annually on biological terrorism as on public
health. But the public health threats are substantial: millions of people die from naturally
occurring disease each year.297 Communicable diseases, such as respiratory infections,
HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis, malaria, measles, tetanus, meningitis, and hepatitis
B, as well as food-borne bacterial infections like salmonella and Escherichia coli, can be
devastating. In contrast, the number of people that have died from the dissemination of biological
agents is extremely small. The emphasis on biological agents risks pulling the focus away from
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more likely threats. Do we really want our public health structure to depend on funding and
planning for biological weapons? Does it make sense to take the focus away from the more
mundane, but potentially equally or even more devastating, diseases, merely because ordinary
pandemics require no human intervention for their construction and dissemination? If we allow
biological weapons to provide the focus, then everything from the type of disease monitored and
the types of vaccines and prophylactics developed, to the nature of health surveillance may
alter—even as resources become consumed that could otherwise go to better use.
The coupling of biological weapons and public health also risks shifting the relationship
between the federal government and the citizens. The national security dialogue is essentially an
adversarial one—in keeping with the pace of weaponization, it suggests that any one individual
could pose a devastating threat to the country. It thus treats individual citizens as potential
adversaries. But we currently have a public health system built on voluntary compliance. What
happens when you create an adversarial relationship between citizens and the government—and
then forcibly attempt to restrain their movement? What happens to voluntary reporting, general
vaccination, and cooperation in the event of a public health emergency?
The recent example of CIA actions in Pakistan is here instructive. The agency, under the
guise of a vaccination program, collected DNA samples from individuals living in Pakistan.
Billed as a free clinic to prevent hepatitis B, the actual aim was to ascertain the presence of Bin
Laden family members.298 Health care workers are now braced for the backlash, as Pakistanis
refuse to come forward for vaccination, because of suspicion that any vaccination program is
being orchestrated by the United States as part of its campaign.299 The risk of prioritizing
national security is that public health, as a consequence, directly suffers.
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While the vaccination campaign took place overseas, the United States has a long history
of resistance to invasive federal actions. By placing public health in an adversarial framing, the
risk arises of feeding into this deep-seated suspicion of coercive power and, in the process,
undermining public health across the board. The movement to include military actors as a way to
implement such authorities further exacerbates the problem.
Added to this are concerns about the more likely occurrence of naturally occurring
disease. Biological weapons are difficult to produce and even harder to disseminate. Does it
make sense to orient our public health system around the lower risk event—particularly when
equally devastating consequences may follow from pandemic disease?
F. Quarantine and Isolation under Fire
The second and final policy consideration relates more specifically to the use of
quarantine and isolation as a response. While grounded in historical precedent, it is not at all
clear that quarantine—and, specifically, cordon sanitaire—works. Yet, even as states bemoaned
the continued rampages of disease and the ineffectiveness of prior quarantine provisions, they
introduced yet broader authorities and more stringent penalties. During the Spanish influenza
epidemic, American towns otherwise cut off from the outside world found that disease
nevertheless traveled into their bounds—arriving, for instance, via the post, on the outside of
packages entering their space. There is a legitimate question, in such an age of such mobility and
connectedness, whether cordon sanitaire can even be accomplished.300 Indeed, the U.S.
influenza plan specifically notes that quarantine may be particularly ineffective for stopping the
spread of the disease. It is for this reason that, unlike the United States, the United Kingdom
eschews any use of quarantine for pandemic influenza.301
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The strongest argument that could be made for it is that quarantine and isolation may
slow the spread of disease. This is an important consideration. Time may be critical in allowing
the government to amass and distribute vaccines, prophylactics, and other medications. And lives
are at stake. Yet even granting that quarantine may retard the disease’s advance, what unintended
consequences might follow? For example, what happens to the provision of basic services—such
as emergency medical care, policing, electricity, and sanitation—when population flows are
severely limited? What about access to other medical services, or the economic effect of bringing
business, government, and education to a standstill? In a severely weakened economy, the
country’s ability to respond to other threats is similarly diminished. What happens when citizens
refuse to abide by the quarantine provisions? How might this undermine state control? And what
happens when you add the military to a civilian mix—in light of very different rules of
engagement from the ordinary law enforcement framing?
It may be, of course, that the proliferation of quarantine authorities are merely
cosmetic—that the federal government does not intend to actually use the powers it is seeking—
that they are, indeed, an outmoded nod to a history based on unsound science. If this is the case,
however, then why even have such powers on the books? For the presence of the laws bring with
them their own form of political and legal legitimacy, which may encourage their use. And the
political will to use such powers may well significantly alter in a crisis.

IV. Concluding Remarks
Two major shifts have occurred with regard to the evolution of measures designed to
counter pandemic disease and biological weapons. The first shift, which solidified in the early
20th century, carved out a role for the federal government in preventing the importation of
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disease into the country and in allowing for federal agencies to stem the transfer of disease
between states through the use of quarantine and isolation. The second shift moved pandemic
disease and biological weapons into a national security realm, linking the two in terms of
institutions, identification, and approach. In this move, quarantine and isolation appear central,
and growing attention is being paid to the role of the military in executing the federal measures.
As a constitutional matter, the first shift rested on an uneasy compromise between the
police powers reserved to the states through the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause—
an agreement forged through use of the Spending Clause. The second shift, however, rests on
shakier constitutional grounds. Significant questions regarding individual rights remain
unanswered, even as four structural problems present themselves: the treatment of public health
within war powers, the role of the military on domestic soil, the limits of Commerce Clause
authority, and the extent to which the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers the federal
government to act. Added to this are concerns about the wisdom of allowing the threat of
biological weapons to set the agenda for public health, and the effectiveness of quarantine and
isolation as a response. These issues warrant further inquiry.
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